In September 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to make the reduction of poverty and the enhancement of economic growth the fundamental objectives of lending operations in its poorest member countries. This paper studies the spending and absorption of aid in PRGF-supported programs, verifies whether the use of aid is programmed to be smoothed over time, and analyzes how considerations about macroeconomic stability influence the programmed use of aid. The paper shows that PRGF-supported programs permit countries to utilize all increases in aid within a few years, showing smoothed use of aid inflows over time. Our results reveal that spending is higher than absorption in both the long-run and short-run use of aid, which is a robust finding of the study. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that the long-run spending exceeds the injected increase of aid inflows in the economy. In addition, the paper finds that the presence of a 
Introduction
Aid is a useful tool that facilitates the transfer of resources from one country to another. It enables recipient countries -predominantly developing countries -to increase consumption and investment. Aid provides an opportunity to reduce poverty, increase the standard of living and generate sustainable economic growth. However, concern for the effective utilization and management of aid dollars in recipient countries has recently been expressed. The imperative to employ aid inflows adequately may stress the administrative capacity of governments. In addition, volatile aid flows create problems of financial management and debt sustainability in the future.
Unlike the international flow of capital, aid money is initially held by the central bank. Governments then can decide whether or not to increase public spending by running a greater fiscal deficit. At the same time, central banks can choose whether or not to absorb aid inflows by selling aid dollars and widening current account deficits. Although most of the aid literature assumes that absorption and spending of aid is equivalent, spending could be different from absorption due to the lack of stark agreement and coordination between the government and the central bank. Such asymmetry between spending and absorption could have quite adverse macroeconomic consequences ).
Questions could therefore arise regarding the advice offered by the IMF to their member countries about the use of aid inflows. Further issues could arise on how considerations of aid volatility, capacity constraints and macroeconomic stability could shape these recommendations. To address these questions, we took as a case the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program, an IMF-supported aid program that plays a catalytic role in unlocking aid dollars to achieve poverty reduction and growth enhancement. The objective of this study is to estimate the programmed spending and absorption of aid for PRFG arrangements. Placing the emphasis on programmed spending rather than actual spending, this study estimates how much spending and absorption is determined by the program design in countries that have a PRGF in place. Furthermore, this study studies whether or not actual spending and absorption is affected by the PRGF program.
A pioneering study on estimating programmed spending and absorption of a PRFG-supported program has been undertaken by Dudine et al. (2008) .
The estimation used in their paper predominantly used pooled estimation techniques which created biased estimations due to the presence of lagged dependent term as one of the regressors in the model. Nevertheless, by using the same dataset, the present study has improved on the estimations of Dudine et al. (2008) and is able to provide efficient estimates and additional insights to this area of study.
This study uses the IMF spending and absorption dataset in estimating reduced form models. The dataset contains data from staff reports concerning requests for, or reviews of, all PRGF programs that were approved during The study demonstrates that PRGF-supported programs permit countries to utilize all increases in aid within a few years, showing smoothed use of aid inflows over time. Our results reveal that spending is higher than absorption in both the long-run and short-run use of aid, which is a robust finding of the study. Furthermore, the study finds that the long-run spending exceeds more that the injected increase of aid into the economy. In contrast, we find weak evidence of profound influence of other control variables on the spending and absorption of aid. Finally, the study finds that the presence of a PRGF-supported program does not influence the actual absorption or spending of aid.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 elucidates the concept of absorption and spending, and the macroeconomic consequences of aid inflows to developing countries. Section 3 describes the PRGF program of IMF to its member countries. Section 4 introduces the key elements of the methodological framework of the estimations. Section 5 gives a brief description of 3 the dataset and control variables used in this study. Section 6 presents the estimation results and section 7 concludes.
Conceptual Framework
The macroeconomic impact of aid inflows typically depends on the policy choices of government authorities. Specifically, the interaction of fiscal, 
Absorption
Using the balance of payments system, aid inflows in the form of grants are booked as a current transfer on the record of current accounts whilst loans are booked on the capital account. Hence, using the simple balance of payments identity we can express the following equations
Where
and
In equation 1, CAB is the current account balance, KAB is the capital account balance and R is the foreign reserves. The current account balance is specified in equation 2, as the net export (export X, minus import M ) 4 plus net private transfers W (mostly remittances and worker compensations) less net interest payments to foreigners (iL + rD), where separate interest payments on market loans (iL) and aid loans (rD) have been used. The last term in equation 2 is the aid grants (A g ). The capital account balance comprises net change in non-aid foreign debt (∆L 0 , having both private and public component) in addition to the aid loan given in a year (A l ) minus the repayment of principal on the aid loans (A r ) which is known as amortization.
Here subscript t denotes year.
Separating the factors of aid from equation 2 and 3 and rearranging these three equations yields:
where NACAB is the non-aid current account balance and NAKAB is the non-aid capital account balance. The aid inflows are the sum of grants and loans less the repayment. 1 Thus an increment in net aid inflow, either grant or loan, can affect the economy in the following ways. It can:
1. Enhance the international reserves;
2. Increase the non-aid current account deficit through net imports of good and services;
3. Finance the payments of interest on foreign debt (both aid and non-aid debt);
4. Finance a reduction in private transfers; and 5. Raise non-aid capital outflows (capital flight).
Realistically, aid will not have any counterpart in increased consumption or investment if the aid dollars are entirely utilized for augmenting foreign reserves or financing capital outflows. Hence, under conventional conditions, the most usual application of aid inflows, as a measure of the direct resource transfer, is to finance a widening of the current account deficit.
Thus, absorption is the decline in the non-aid current account balance that 
Spending
Utilizing national account identities, spending catches the magnitude by which the aid inflow is utilized to finance an increase in government expenditure or a decrease in taxation. Using fiscal side definitions,
which makes
where G is the government expenditure, T is the domestic revenue and A is the aid inflows. Now deducting aid inflows (A) from the both side of the equation 7 yields,
Hence, with an increment of net aid inflows, governments can either 1. Reduce domestic revenues, 2. Increase government expenditure, or 3. Reduce domestic borrowing.
Thus, spending is the decline in the non-aid fiscal deficit that is determinable to aid. More formally,
Although aid sometimes comes as non-fungible project assistance, governments can take the decision whether or not to enhance the overall fiscal deficit as aid increases, which is largely the settlement of the fiscal authorities.
Spending and Absorption
Since spending and absorption are dealt with by different authorities, spending will be different from absorption, if perfect agreement and co-ordination are absent, although there are some cases such as aid in kind and aid dedicated to finance government import, in which spending will be equal to The spending and absorption of aid are the same when the widening of the current account deficit acts in line with the fiscal deficit. In this case, the increased fiscal net demand is fulfilled by increasing net imports. However, there are cases where absorption will be higher than spending if central bank authorities decide to sell more foreign exchanges associated with increased aid inflows than is necessary. Such increases in the sell of foreign exchanges are utilized to finance domestic debt which has occurred as a result of higher government spending. This leads to sluggish monetary growth, appreciated real exchange rate, lower inflation and reduced interest rate. The end result will be increased private consumption and higher domestic investment, which may increase net imports.
In contrast, spending could be greater than absorption when central bank authorities decide to sell fewer foreign exchanges associated with increased aid inflows than is necessary. In this case, fiscal deficit increases due to higher government spending, but aid is accumulated to build the central bank's foreign reserves. Fiscal authorities are financing the widening of fiscal deficit through domestic borrowing, which results in a depreciated real exchange rate, higher inflation and a greater interest rate. This leads to lower consumption and private investment, and tends to shift resources from the private sector to the public sector; thus, spending will be greater than absorption.
The total net foreign aid disbursed by donor countries has increased over the years, but this has been followed by growing aid volatility in both the announcement and disbursement of aid (Aslam and Kim 2007 is also added to the accounting of the aid inflows. 4 Hence, this study computes aid inflow on a cash basis to appropriate the net transfer of financial resources from donors to recipient countries.
Methodology
Following the IEO (2007) and Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008) approach, the following models have been used to capture the absorption and spending of aid:
Where i denotes the country, t denotes time (which is uniquely ranked and based on the date the document was published) and ∆ denotes the difference between the programmed level and actual level. For example, the term
Continent-specific dummies are used to capture the unobserved time independent constant effect (µ i ) as Putman (1993) Similarly, we used the following alternative models in levels to estimate the fraction of the aid inflows that is programmed to be absorbed and spent over time:
Here, the parameters of interest are βs since they capture the short run absorption and spending of aid inflows. One may argue that the dependent variables of the aforementioned equations also depend on their past values.
In that case, we need to use the lag dependent variable as a regressor to capture the level of persistency in the regression. Such inclusions convert the above equations into Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) models. In the case of absorption and spending, the equations become,
Likewise, by introducing the lagged dependent variable as regressor, the alternative models in levels become
Here ρs capture the level of persistence of the lagged dependent variable.
To test the hypothesis of cross-sectional independence in panel-data models with small T and large N, we employed semi-parametric tests proposed by Friedman (1937) and Frees (1995 Frees ( , 2004 as well as the parametric testing procedure proposed by Pesaran (2004) . 5 Results of these tests showed evidence of contemporaneous correlation across the units. We also found evidence of group-wise heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms (using a modified Wald test and Wooldridge test). To estimate equations 9 to 12, we used the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) method with correction for panel specific AR1 process (within panels) and heteroscedasticity (across panels).
Equations 13 to 16, on the other hand, cannot be consistently estimated using FGLS or OLS due to the presence of lagged dependent term as one of the regressors. Due to the endogenous nature, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term of the estimation which creates a largesample bias in the estimation (Nickell 1981 
Data and Variables

Data description
The dataset is available from the IMF website and contains data from staff In the dataset, aid is constructed using both a national accounting and balance of payments approach. The variable 'fiscal-aid' is constructed as 6 Blundell and Bond's system estimator, also known as 'System GMM', is an extension of the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator.
7 It contains the staff reports on the request and reviews of the PRGF programs. 
Control Variables
For the spending regressions, we controlled for the lagged changed in fiscal deficit (net to aid), lag of overall fiscal deficit, real GDP growth and the lag of the inflation rate. The first control variable is used to capture the indirect effect of past aid on the current fiscal deficit (net of aid). Inclusion of this variable also captures the concern of the fiscal authorities in keeping the level of deficit stable. The lag of overall fiscal deficit captures the concerns about fiscal consolidation. A negative coefficient implies that the greater the overall fiscal deficit in the past, the lower the programmed fiscal deficit net of aid. Real GDP growth controls for the cyclicality of fiscal policy. A negative coefficient entails higher deficit is programmed when economic growth slows down. Finally, the lag of inflation rate captures the impact of fiscal policy on internal macroeconomic stability; thus, a negative coefficient implies that as past inflation is higher, the larger is the programmed reduction in the fiscal deficit.
Similarly, for absorption equations, we controlled for lagged change in the current account deficit (net of aid), lag of overall current account deficit, the lag change in the term of trade, the change of overall fiscal deficit, per capita GDP (relative to that of the US) and the lag of reserve coverage in term 
Estimation results
The estimation results suggest that the PRGF program supports the full use of aid over time. In this section we will discuss simple and elaborate models to address various dimensions of the use of aid. Note that in all regression analysis, outliers are detected and excluded following the criteria used in Table 1 reports the programmed absorption of aid increase, whereas Table   2 reports the programmed spending of aid increase with various regression models. These sets of models are employed here to replicate the results of the IEO (2007) with better dataset and improved estimation techniques. Although our preferred estimate is the Blundell-Bond GMM estimation (Model 6), we still used other models to check the robustness of our estimations.
Absorption, Spending and Smoothing of Aid Increase
To capture the amount of smoothing, the lagged change in aid is included in the regression. Such control variables are appropriate to estimate the programmed widening of the current account deficit (or fiscal deficit), which is influenced by the use of the aid changes that were not absorbed (or spent)
in the previous year and a positive coefficient of the lagged change in aid implies the smoothing of the aid inflows.
The regressions in Table 1 suggest that immediate absorption of aid inflow is 59 percent, whereas Our regressions also provide evidence of smoothing in both absorption and spending estimations. Model 3 of the absorption regression shows that 26 percent of the expected increase in aid is programmed to be absorbed in the first programming year, whereas the coefficient on the lagged increase in aid indicates that 14 percent of the past increase in aid is to be absorbed in the programming year. Similarly, Model 3 of the spending regression shows that 72 percent of the aid increase is programmed to be spent immediately and about 27 percent is programmed to be utilized in the following year.
[ Table 1 and 2 about here]
Controlling for other variables suggests that concerns for fiscal instability and reserve inadequacy can weaken the programmed absorption and spending of aid. Likewise, we find evidence of difference in spending and absorption for countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The coefficient of the interaction term between SSA and aid increase suggests that spending and absorption is significantly higher for the countries that belong to SSA areas.
An alternative method for examining the smoothing of the use of aid is to use the cumulative increase of the programmed fiscal deficits (or current account deficit) over a two-year period and the projected increase in aid over the same period. In the case of spending, the regression confirms that the spending of aid over a two-year period is more than 81 percent (Table 2, Model 5). This finding is quite important since it shows that fiscal deficits are programmed for a time horizon that is longer than one year. Similarly, for absorption the regression indicates that the absorption of aid over a two-year period is about 56 percent (Table 1 , Model 5).
In our preferred regression for both spending and absorption, we find weak evidence for the smoothing of aid use. One reason for this finding could be the use of only positive changes in aid in the regressions, which provide partial and quite plausibly misleading results of the regressions. In the next subsection, we will relax such restrictions.
Absorption, Spending and Smoothing of Aid
Restricting the sample for only positive changes in aid provides a partial and misleading scenario of the use of aid. In the case of aid volatility, consideration of the treatment of both aid increase and decrease should be included to correctly understand the use of aid. Aid volatility elicits the question as to weather the programmed response to changes in aid is symmetric. To answer this question, we looked at both directions of the changes in aid inflows.
[ Table 3 and 4 about here] Table 3 and Table 4 of the spending regression shows evidence of smoothing of aid, as some 44 percent of aid increase is programmed to be used immediately, whereas roughly 33 percent of the past increase in aid is to be spent in the current programming year, making the eventual spending ratio 78 percent.
To control for the symmetric use of aid, we used an interaction term between the expected change in aid with a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the expected change in aid is negative. Our regressions indicate that in the case of absorption, the aid decreases are treated asymmetrically to aid increases since the interaction term is significant and negative. The negative sign of the interaction term suggests that if aid is expected to fall over the course of the program, the programmed contraction of the current account deficit net of aid is smaller than the expansion that is permitted during aid increments. However, in the case of spending, such asymmetry does not exist. Furthermore, in the two-year horizon model (Model 2 in Table   3 and 4) we did not find any evidence of asymmetric use of aid. Findings of symmetric treatment of aid increases and decreases in the longer policy horizon could be driven by the expected stability of future aid flows.
In spending regressions, we found evidence that higher past overall fiscal deficit decreases the programmed change in fiscal deficit, and the significant coefficient of the lagged change in the fiscal deficit indicates the importance of stabilizing the deficit over time. Similarly, inflation has a considerable effect on the programmed change of fiscal deficit net of aid. In spending equations, we found significant association of reserve coverage and terms of trade with the change in the current account deficit net of aid, where both of these variables widen the programmed current account deficit. Tables 5 and 6 report the various models used to estimate the absorption, spending and smoothing of the aid use by employing the actual rather than the programmed data of spending and absorption. This analysis will help in understanding the behavior of actual spending and absorption of aid compared with the programmed spending and absorption. The result for absorption (Model 8 in Table 5 ) suggests that actual absorption of the aid is about 28 percent with no evidence of smoothing of aid. This absorption rate is lower than the estimated programmed absorption found in previous subsections.
Actual Absorption, Spending and Smoothing of Aid
[ Table 5 Tables 5 and 6 ). Furthermore, we control for the aid surprise, which is defined as the increments in aid that were not predicted during the programming period. Our preferred estimations Tables 7 and 8 represent the estimations of spending and absorption of aid using levels of data (as a percentage of GDP) rather than the differences.
Absorption, Spending and Smoothing using levels of Aid
These estimations are done as a robustness check to our previous estima-tions. By using the actual and programmed data for levels of aid flows, the regression coefficients measure the fraction of aid inflow that is absorbed and spent over time.
Once again, our preferred models are Models 4 and 6 in both tables which employed the Blundell and Bond GMM estimations otherwise known as System GMM techniques. The estimated programmed absorption is approximately 46 percent in contrast with estimated actual absorption of about 34 percent. Coherent with the earlier estimations of this study, the estimated actual absorption is found to be lower than the programmed absorption.
Model 6 of Table 7 also reveals that past current account deficit has significant positive association with the programmed year's current account deficit net of aid, showing the persistent nature of the deficit in the balance of payments.
[ Table 7 and 8 about here]
The estimated programmed spending is approximately 74 percent, whereas actual spending is some 97 percent. Consistent with the findings of the previous subsection, we find that actual spending is higher than the programmed spending with evidence of smoothing of actual aid over time. The long-run spending is estimated to be higher than 100 percent, which makes the analysis coherent with the findings of earlier sub-sections. Furthermore, we found evidence that higher past overall fiscal deficit decreases the actual fiscal deficit of the program year.
Conclusion
Improving on Dudine et al. (2008) , this study utilizes Blundell and Bond's System GMM estimator to provide consistent estimates of the programmed absorption and spending of aid. However, the finding of the study should be received with caution as the estimations may have suffered due to the complexities of the issues and caveats resulting from the unavailability of data and the presence of outliers for important variables over the period we examined.
The study provides compelling evidence that PRGF-supported programs permit countries to utilize all increases in aid within a few years, demonstrating smoothed use of aid inflows over time. In addition, our result reveals that spending is higher than absorption in both the long-run and short-run use of aid and shows evidence of the injection of liquidity into the domestic economies of developing countries. Furthermore, the study finds that the long-run spending exceeds the injected increase of aid inflows in the economy. In contrast, we find weak evidence of profound influence of other control variables on the spending and absorption of aid. Finally, the study finds that the presence of a PRGF-supported program does not influence the actual absorption or spending of aid.
We suggest the following policy implications as a result of this study. Since macroeconomic considerations appear to have no influence over aid commitments and disbursements, aid agencies should take account of the macroeconomic stability of an economy, as aid is found to have significant associations with balance of payments and national income accounting. Aid is sometimes received as non-fungible project assistance, which raises government expenditure. Aid agencies should be cognisant of this type of assistance, as governments may need to cut necessary consumptions to finance aid-funded projects or may need to finance the expenditure from domestic borrowing.
Aid volatility is also a concern for recipient countries which leads governments to delay the immediate use of aid increments. Such volatility should be reduced to improve the immediate use of aid. Let Y e i,t be the expected level and Y i,t be the actual level of such variable for country i for at t. Similarly, X p i,t , X e i,t and X i,t are respectively the programmed, expected and actual level of aid for country i at time t. Finally, let Z i,t be a vector of explanatory variables and u i,t a zero-mean independent and identically distributed error term. We introduce µ i as the country specific time invariant effect. Thus the equations in levels for the programme can be expressed as:
Assume that the actual level of the endogenous variable is described by the following model:
where ε i,t is a zero-mean independent and identically distributed error term.
Note when an IMF program is designed, the realization of ε i,t , the actual level of aid X i,t and the actual level of the exogenous variables Z i,t are not known. Hence programmed and expected values are used which makes the above equation as
where E[ε i,t ] = 0. Assume that the programmed level of aid is exogenously determined whereas the expectations about the level of the exogenous variables are based on the past realization of these variables. 9 Lets use the following equation:
where ψ i,t is a zero mean error term. If we plug equation 20 into 19 and rearrange the terms, we obtain
Which is our equation in levels (equation 17) provided that β 0 = α 0 + α 3 ϕ,
To obtain the equations in differences and purging the country specific fixed effect, we first use equation 18 to obtain Y i,t−1 . Then we subtract the Y i,t−1 from the both side of the equation 21 to obtain
Hence, re-parameterizing the above equation, we can rewrite as
Here
This model allows to identify possible estimation problems. For instance, from ω i,t = α 3 ψ i,t − ε i,t−1 , we can see that the error term of the equation in difference is correlated with one of the regressors, namely
which is corrected by using dynamic panel data estimation techniques in the regression estimation.
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B Appendix: Estimation Results Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%, **5%, *10%. In model 1 to 4, the sample is restricted to observations where 0 < ∆Aid < 10, −10 < ∆Current account deficit (net of aid) (t−1) < 10. In model 5, the sample is restricted where 0 < ∆Aid < 10 and −20 < ∆Current account deficit (net of aid) (t−1) < 20. ‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation. Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%, **5%, *10%. In model 1 to 4, sample is restricted to observations where 0 < ∆Aid < 10, ∆Aid (t−1) > −10, −10 < ∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid) (t−1) < 10 and Overall fiscal deficit (t−1) < 20. In model 5, the sample is restricted to observations where 0 < ∆Aid < 10 and −20 < ∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid) (t−1) < 20. ‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation. Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%, **5%, *10%. In model 1 and 3, sample is restricted to observations where −10 < ∆Aid < 10, ∆Aid (t−1) > −20 and −10 < ∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid) (t−1) < 10.
In model 2, the sample is restricted to observations where −10 < ∆Aid < 10. ‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation. Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%, **5%, *10%. In model 1 to 3 and 5, the sample is restricted to observations where Current account deficit < 70. ‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation. 
